Introduction
The final report of the World Health Organization (WHO) Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) consolidated evidence on the social determinants of health (SDH) and reiterated their importance in determining both overall population health and the distribution of health within and between countries (CSDH, 2008) . Recognising that evidence by itself was unlikely to bring about policy change, the report also called on heads of national governments to provide leadership and adopt a whole-of-government approach to tackling SDH. However, the health sector was seen to have special stewardship responsibilities to take account of SDH in its own actions and advocate for other sectors to address the health impacts of their policies. Here we report on qualitative interviews with former Australian health ministers concerning their views about how and why the windows of policy opportunity on the SDH did, or did not open during their tenure. Party (ALP) or a conservative coalition of the Liberal Party and the smaller, rural-based National Party (Woodward et al., 2010) .
State governments manage public hospitals and other public health services and the Commonwealth funds general medical practice. In 1984 a federal Labor Government introduced Medicare, a universal public health insurance scheme which has remained central to the health system despite measures introduced by subsequent Coalition governments which have increased reliance on private health insurance (Duckett, 2007) . The potential for differences of ideology and political interest between levels of government, along with the division of responsibilities for health, have provided fertile ground for blame-shifting and regulatory complexity (Woodward et al., 2010) .
Despite State and Commonwealth interventions over several decades, and gains in land rights and political recognition, significant gaps remain between Australia's Indigenous Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (hereafter, 'Aboriginal people') and non-Aboriginal people in life expectancy, chronic disease, education, employment, smoking and access to health services (AIHW, 2012) . The relatively poor health of Aboriginal people reflects a history of colonisation, dispossession, paternalism and economic marginalisation. A national strategy to 'Close the Gap' includes health service, education and employment interventions (Baum et al., 2012) . Poverty (as measured by those living on less than half the median income) has slightly increased in Australia over the last decade and in 2012 stood at 12.3% (ACOSS, 2012) while the peripheries of Australia's major cities contain pockets of extreme disadvantage. Income inequality in Australia has increased in recent years and Australia remains one of the six most unequal countries in the OECD (OECD, 2011) despite a cultural perception of egalitarianism.
Continuing health inequities
Despite a history of evidence, enquiries and statements about SDH and health inequity (DHSS, 1980; CSDH, 2008; WHO, 2011) , and while average life expectancy continues to increase, progress is uneven and inequities are increasing both within and between countries (Labonté et al., 2007; Stamatakis et al., 2010) . In Australia, persistent health inequities are evident in the ten year gap in life expectancy between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, and in a socio-economic health gradient (AIHW, 2012) . Despite this, there have only been limited policy responses addressing health inequities and progress has been uneven across jurisdictions (Newman et al., 2006) . Dahlgren and Whitehead (2006) noted that health policies often focus on increases in average health status rather than reducing inequities.
Many (e.g. Baum, 2008; Blackman et al., 2010; Bryant et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2009 ) also argue that biomedical, individualised views of health excessively influence health policy and detract from actions to improve population health. Taken together, the long history of evidence on SDH and the failure to reduce health inequities clearly points to the need for research that asks why there have been so many political and policy failures in relation to action on SDH. Exworthy (2008) elaborated on the complexity of taking policy action on the SDH by noting it requires a long term perspective, has trouble making attributions of change to specific policies, and involves decisions and non-decisions by multiple agencies and stakeholders with interconnected policy programs. Exworthy et al. (2003) and Collins et al. (2007) recommended a political and policy theory lens to understand why the policy processes that lead to action on the SDH have often been marginalised.
Theories of policy making and policy action
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Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au Theoretical perspectives of policy making as a rational process directly informed by evidence (Anderson, 1984) are not supported by empirical observation, and contrast with Kingdon's (2011) 'multiple streams' theory which argues that policy action on an issue is most likely when the three streams of problem definition, policy formulation and political will converge. In Kingdon's view, prospective policies are drawn from a 'primeval soup' where ideas are constantly being developed and floated. Kingdon also gave a central role to 'policy entrepreneurs' who use any available windows of opportunity to advance ideas. He saw policy development as messy and driven by the ideologies and values of key actors. Lewis (2005) showed how Australian health policy networks are imbued with a bio-medical ideology, supporting studies on the ideological underpinning of public health policy by Tesh (1988) , who demonstrated that 'hidden arguments' determine the nature of policy. In particular she highlights the individualism that is implicit in much United States (US) health policy. Consequently, modern policy analysis frequently follows Bacchi's (2009) In researching the influence of evidence on policy in Canada, Lomas and Brown (2009) found that complex forces compete with research for the attention of civil servants and politicians and that research evidence is variably received at different stages of policy development. Other research has shown how research collaboration between academics and policymakers facilitates translation of evidence into policy (Best et al., 2009; Howlett, 2009 ), but it tends to underplay Kingdon's insights about political support and timeliness as a vital feature of policymaking. Knowledge translation and knowledge exchange models appear naïve unless they can recognise the role of political will. DeQuincy and Reed (2007) argued that political will has been understudied in public health policy and needs more attention. Our qualitative study presents empirical information relevant to theoretical debates about political and other factors influencing translation of evidence into policy. It reports on the views of twenty former health ministers about policy opportunities during their tenure to address SDH and health inequities.
Methods
Health minister interviews
This study is based on qualitative interviews with 20 former Australian Federal, State or Territory health ministers, conducted between September and December 2011. There were 38 health ministers who met the study criteria: having held office for at least two years between 1985 and the time of sample (May 2011), and not currently in parliament. The research team identified initial contacts for 37 of these from their own knowledge, publicly available records via an internet search, or via the former minister's political party. One had died and one was in jail. Direct contact was made with 25, of whom 20 agreed to be interviewed, four did not respond and one declined. Eighteen were interviewed face to face and two by telephone. Thirteen of these represented the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in government, six the Liberal Party, and one was an independent (in a Liberal government).
Four were national health ministers and the remaining sixteen were from State and Territory jurisdictions. The final sample contained a higher proportion of members of the ALP than the original 38 but contained sufficient diversity to adequately represent the position of health minister within Australian national and State governments over the last quarter of a century.
The interviews began with questions about the health ministers' foci and achievements and their role in cabinet. Then, we asked about the respective roles of evidence about public health, SDH and health inequalities, and the role of medical professionals and interest groups in influencing their actions on policy. A draft of the schedule was sent for review to Hon. Patton (2002: 306) including possible distortion due to personal or political bias, or recall error which may also be influenced by the length of time since the events discussed occurred. However, we also note that subjects in this research are often discussing events on the public record, used to being interviewed by people who check facts, and were deliberately chosen as former politicians no longer subject to the possible constraints of an active public office. A number of subjects have also written accounts of their period in office or kept diaries, which they may have referred to in preparing for the interview. Ethics approval was granted by Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee.
Analysis
Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim then sent as text to the relevant ex-Minister to read, approve and clarify where required. We then thematically analysed the transcripts drawing on Ritchie and Spencer's (1994) stages of familiarisation with data, development of coding frameworks using targeted and emerging themes, coding, and charting and mapping. Qualitative analysis software (NVivo 9) was used to manage data and organise the coding. Each member of our research team read all transcripts. Our coding frame was developed iteratively as we read the transcripts and developed new codes. Each transcript was then coded by two team members. After double coding, each transcript was discussed in detail by the two team members involved and agreement reached, involving the full research team if necessary. Our thematic analysis was shaped by the theoretical framework of Kingdon which enabled us to code for accounts of the problem, the policy, the political stream of influences and the role of policy entrepreneurs, networks, values and ideologies. A draft of this paper was sent to each health minister for checking and advice on whether there was potential to identify people inappropriately. Only one minister requested a change and this was to shorten a quote to make the meaning more transparent.
Results
Ministers' perceptions of social determinants and equity
All former ministers claimed explicit awareness of inequalities in health outcomes or risk factors between population groups during their tenure; especially mentioned were inequalities between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, or between low SES groups (or areas) and the rest of the population. Only a small minority used the concept of a health gradient driven by SDH and, of those, two commented that this awareness had developed since their period in office. Only a very small minority of interviewees spoke in explicit terms about health being determined through combined effects of multiple social factors; or about structural, economic and social factors influencing the distribution of social advantage/disadvantage and health across populations. Again, these appeared to be perspectives acquired or more fully developed after the period as Minister:
It was a period before some of the broader social determinants of health problems began to emerge; for example, arguments about how public transport, housing, related to public health, which has become of much more interest since that period. We were more concerned with, I suppose, a narrower view of preventive health. (Commonwealth, Labor, 1980s) Despite the 1980s being seen in this way as a period characterised by a "narrower" view, the only example (described below) of a minister really paying serious attention to the SDH and explicitly talking extensively about a social health agenda came from that period. For the rest of the health ministers health inequity was seen in terms of the poor health of disadvantaged groups and they rarely spontaneously used the language of SDH except in response to prompts and in relation to Aboriginal health. Nearly all expressed strong appreciation that action on the SDH in relation to the health status of Aboriginal Australians was essential, as it could not be addressed through better targeted and better resourced health care services alone:
Indigenous health was clearly an area where social determinants were far more important than any service the Health Department might or might not deliver… in the absence of really substantial investment in housing and infrastructure in the remote areas in particular there wasn't going to be much improvement in the quality of peoples ' lives. (Federal, ALP, 1990s) 
Extent of action on the social determinants
While nearly all health ministers demonstrated some understanding of the importance of SDH, they took limited explicit actions to address them in order to promote health or improve heath equity. Table 1 divides the action reported into three categories: improving access to health care; implementing public health policies informed by an understanding of the SDH; and policy initiatives aimed at addressing and modifying SDH that sit outside the health sector. Only a very small minority reported action in the latter category.
One exception was an ALP State health minister from the 1980s who had developed a Social Health Strategy and a range of inter-sectoral work. The reasons for the successes of those that managed to take action on the SDH and the barriers to others doing so are discussed below. The ministers more inclined to action on the SDH were most likely to see peoples' health as largely shaped by factors outside individual control. These philosophical positions related to the ways in which they viewed evidence on the SDH.
The role of evidence in policy-making
Nearly all former Ministers said they were aware of evidence on health inequalities during their tenure, and many described it as motivating and supporting the kinds of policy actions outlined in Table 1 . Within the cabinet, ministers described population health evidence as an important tool for making an argument for new policy, sometimes in the face of strong opposition from colleagues: (Federal, Liberal, 1990s) Thus the ministers saw public health evidence as a necessary part of policy making but, not surprisingly, these former politicians were also conscious of limitations on the role of evidence in the face of their political 'realities' and ideological values.
Political ideology
All health ministers' accounts suggested that underlying ideologies affected the extent to which they championed action addressing health equity through action on the SDH. (Federal ALP, 1980s) This was a clear statement of the role of the health sector in increasing access to health care within a broader program of action on social equity. These reforms rested on a broader commitment to social justice, pragmatically linked to an economic reform agenda.
Competing interest groups
Every health minister made it clear that their health policy agendas were 'crowded' (Kingdon, 2011) 
From what I've observed, the job of many Ministers for Health has been to keep the lid on things and put out the inevitable bushfires and even then it's just pouring money into stopping the emergency waits and reducing elective surgery lists -you know, it's all the acute sector because that's where the media and the political noise of powerful stakeholders unite to get political action. (State/Territory, ALP, 2000s)
Ministers' accounts identified many specific ways in which the constant threat of an acute care crisis had crowded other issues off the health policy agenda or effectively prevented long term planning for action on social determinants.
This meant that a policy area outside the provision of health care services was unlikely to surface from Kingdon's 'primeval soup' without strong support from a minister. Even a minister very strongly convinced of the importance of prevention recounted difficulties in bringing it to the policy agenda:
I found there was a huge emphasis -I discovered on the first day as a minister -on the tertiary hospitals and on the emergency situations and on doctors being able to push their campaigns for additional funding based on care… I found that the emphasis on prevention in health was almost non-existent. (State/Territory, ALP, 2000s)
Another lamented that despite their aim of increasing access to health services by reorienting the system to primary health care: 
. I'm sad that I was never really able to do that. (State/Territory Liberals 1990s)
Each minister recounted stories of how health became a front page story when doctors' lobby groups spoke to the media about how lives would be threatened by a change to service provision or failure to allocate more funding to acute care from an already stretched health budget. About half described how, in this environment, their efforts and successes in public health could not compete:
…it doesn't change the fact that what will be on the front page of the paper is the fact that there was an eight hour wait in accident and emergency, not the fact that 90 something percent of kids are immunised or that our AIDS infection rates were falling
or all of that sort of stuff. (State/Territory, Liberal, 1990s) It seemed that, for these ministers, in the face of a very crowded policy agenda, the policy influence of the acute care sector and lack of comparably powerful interest groups arguing for action on prevention and SDH meant that policy in the latter areas was nearly always pushed to the margins.
Medical power within health portfolios
This dominance of the health portfolio policy agenda by the concerns of acute care leads straight to the question of who holds power within the health portfolio. /Territory, Labor, 1980s) This insight appeared vital in light of the very many accounts of medical power which ministers gave; described by some as further reinforced by a history of budget allocation strongly favouring acute services in hospitals. This minister spoke of how hard it was to "turn the ship around" in the relatively brief term of a health minister: practical, very, very highly practical. (Federal, Liberals, 1990s) Internationally, WHO was mentioned as influential for a minority of ministers and Dr.
Halfdan Mahler (WHO Director General 1973 -1988 was singled out by one:
I'd been enormously influenced by Mahler as the Head of the World Health Organisation, I'd met him a number of times both overseas and in Australia, and he was very much on this first wave of preventive activity. With Medicare we argued that one of the reasons for this lower status of health was the problems of access for
poorer people so Medicare, one of the arguments for it, was that it would help to redress some of these problems. (Federal, ALP, 1980s) 20
Despite these examples, the accounts suggest that there have been very few policy entrepreneurs with a sufficiently strong power base to motivate policy making on health equity or the social determinants in Australia, especially in contrast to the effectiveness of powerful medical groups lobbying for acute services. The successful SDH policy entrepreneurs mentioned were linked to some formal structure which had as part of its remit paying attention to SDH -a social health office, a review of preventative health and a health promotion foundation, the WHO, or the CSDH.
Policy mechanisms available to health ministers
Nearly all ministers identified increasing access to good quality health services as the aspect of health equity most within their control. However, they also frequently recognised that many factors influencing health were outside the control of the health sector: The biggest issue they had, they saw, was lack of jobs. The medical service wasn't going to fix that. (State/Territory ALP, 1990s) A sense of powerlessness arising from this realisation was evident in this and other ministers' comments, and is likely to be a common response when health ministers are lobbied about social determinants without due regard to the limits of their power to act.
Political mechanisms to keep policy windows open
Ministers accounts suggested that the political opportunities for advancing new policy were generally most favourable when the following elements combined: the health minister acted as a policy entrepreneur for the issue; both cabinet colleagues and Treasury showed at least no major opposition and preferably offered support; and there was support from their Government leader. They also suggested that this rarely happened for policy on the SDH.
We can, however, learn from accounts of ministers who did strive to take some action on ? You bet. (Federal, Liberal, 1990s) This is a very clear example of a government prepared to manage political risk because they believed it was the right thing to do; a stance consistent with the Commission on Social
Determinants of Health's position that action should be taken on SDH for moral reasons.
Ministers seemed more willing (or able) to pay attention to social determinants and make subsequent political decisions when they either held more than one portfolio or were a minister of human services with a portfolio including health. More generally, however, it seemed either a lack of political support inside Cabinet or an absence of well-established cross-portfolio mechanisms could and did, in effect, limit policy opportunities for action on SDH.
Discussion
Our study indicates that health ministers from both Australian political parties can point to important health sector reforms (summarised in Table 1 ) that were seen to contribute to health equity. However their appraisals indicate that, with one exception, they were able to make little progress in advancing comprehensive policies to address SDH. The main actions they described were increasing access to health care services, and implementing disease prevention and health promotion programs in ways that took account of social effects on behaviour. Although in the latter case, it appeared that behavioural solutions sometimes overrode good intentions concerning SDH, akin to the lifestyle drift described by whereby policies start off with statements about social determinants but end up with behavioural solutions only. We found only a few instances of the health sector leading cross-sectoral action on the SDH. We are aware of more recent policy achievements in this
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The health ministers' accounts are consistent with Exworthy's (2008) explanations that social determinants are hard to act on in conventional policy-making environments because they are complex. Complexity science is increasingly drawn upon to examine the implementation of health promotion policy (Alvaro et al., 2010; Hawe et al., 2009 ) in terms of it occurring in systems that are non-linear, emergent, adaptive, unpredictable, dynamic and very dependent on history. This is especially difficult because the SDH agenda competes for policy attention with problems that are more straightforward and do not carry the demand for complex, multifaceted responses implicit in the evidence on SDH (Exworthy, 2008) .
This study also indicates that responses to inequities depend on whether ideologies stress personal responsibility or the impact of structural disadvantage. This is consistent with Tesh All the health ministers consistently stressed the extent to which the power of organised professions within health, especially the medical profession, drove the health policy agenda and captured their attention, confirming other research which points to 'medical dominance' (Smith et al., 2009; Busfield, 2010) . Medical power was evident across each of Kingdon's streams. In the problem stream, health policy is dominated by the immediacy of illnesses requiring acute care services, with public opinion and the media strongly reinforcing this position. In policy, bio-medical paradigms propose a clear solution to illness. Generally these solutions are understandable to politicians and the community, which contrasts strongly with the complexity of SDH. Based on the ministers' accounts, medical policy entrepreneurs are powerful, experienced players and not afraid to hold politicians to ransom through the media and during elections campaigns. This ability to influence public mood and its impact on elections reinforces the point made by Kingdon (2011: 164) that the forces shaping policy are far from equal in practice and that 'The mood-election combination has particularly powerful impacts on the agenda. It can force some subjects high on the agenda and can also make it virtually impossible for governments to pay serious attention to others'. In the politics stream, ministers' accounts suggested that advocates for the SDH hold far less power than most other players on the health policy field and are easily crowded out by advocates for acute health care services.
Health equity concerns both gradients and disadvantaged groups. However, in Australia, potential policy solutions for gradients -generally requiring reduced levels of socioeconomic inequality 'across the board' -have been more highly contested than policies targeted toward disadvantaged groups (Baum et al., 2012 ). Thus we place them firmly in the right hand, upper quadrant of Figure 1 . The limited record of policy action on socioeconomic and health inequalities by Australian governments -despite the long-standing evidence on the association between the two -may perhaps also reflect a degree of normalisation. As Kingdon (2011: 170) Only a small minority of ministers discussed the need to flatten the health gradient, and then tended to focus on the need for redistributive policies across all portfolio areas and the political difficulties of these strategies in an age of neo-liberalism that favours market-driven policies. Ministers who held office in the 1980s noted that redistributive policies had become progressively less favoured since that time. The lack of supportive environments for a SDH agenda in the face of neo-liberal ideologies has been noted previously in Canada (Bryant et al., 2010) , the US (Navarro, 2002) and Australia (Nutbeam & Boxall, 2008) .
Our study indicates that policy spaces for action on the SDH require that the rest of the health portfolio area is not perceived to be in crisis. Yet in the past decade health systems in Australia and elsewhere have been presented as such because of increasing costs of, and demand for, health care services (Australian Government, 2010; WHO, 2009 ). The accounts of former health ministers when faced with similar issues sheds light on the political difficulties in re-directing attention and resources to SDH, when such actions would not appease demand for resources from the acute care sector, and would present their colleagues (and the public) with long term, complex and contested policy options. We found that there have been instances of Australian health policy addressing the SDH over the past twenty five years but they are rare and the windows of opportunity that made them possible have not stayed open for long. The political stream was enabling when the general ideological climate was supportive of redistributive policies, the health care sector was not perceived to be in crisis, and there was support for action from the head of government, cabinet colleagues and no opposition from powerful lobby groups.
